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S
ix weeks after exhausting elections to 
the Assembly, the Brexit referendum 
campaigns in Northern Ireland were 
strangely low key. Conducted almost 
entirely over the media, and with apparently 
only passing concern for the implications for 
the stability of Northern Ireland, political parties 
established for the sole purpose of defining 
local borders, struggled to motivate their 
activists on the apparently less pressing issue of 
the European Union. 
Occasional warnings by former Prime 
Ministers that leaving the European Union 
would put Northern Ireland's "future at risk” by 
threatening its current stability were dismissed 
by a virulently pro-Leave Secretary of State as 
“highly irresponsible”. Elsewhere, what passed 
for debate was largely filtered through the 
traditional sectarian lens. The Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) and Traditional Unionist 
Voice (TUV) took their opportunity to restate 
their unchanging support for “British” supremacy 
by backing Leave. The Ulster Unionists, smarting 
from a disappointing Assembly election 
performance against the DUP, were internally 
split. The pragmatic pro-business and pro-
farmer leadership agreed to soft support for 
Remain arguing that, “on balance, Northern 
Ireland is better remaining in the EU”. But the 
vulnerability of a Unionist Party to the charge 
of softness on constitutional issues still obliged 
them to protect their British flank by explicitly 
allowing members to campaign on either side. 
Sinn Fein made little effort to shape what 
was a British political debate on an issue which 
exposed the ambiguity of republican positions 
over previous decades: the European Union. 
Only the nationalist Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP) and Alliance, respectively 
the fourth and fifth largest parties, campaigned 
with any enthusiasm for Remain, within the 
limits of already overstretched resources. 
Playing Jenga? 
Northern Ireland 
after Brexit
The European Union referendum campaign in Northern Ireland was 
muted, but the result has sparked serious concerns about stability, 
prosperity and peace in the once restive region. Duncan Morrow and 
Jonny Byrne report.  
In practice, the most agitated pro-Remain 
influence was the Irish government, which took 
huge diplomatic risks by directly attempting 
to influence the outcome of a referendum in a 
neighbouring state.
From Low Key to High Stakes
Much of this was reflected in the turnout. 
Although 62.7 per cent made it to the polls 
(up from under 55 per cent in May’s devolved 
elections) enthusiasm was the lowest in the UK. 
Furthermore, voters in nationalist heartlands 
were by far the least likely to vote. For the first 
time in many elections, turnouts in the largely 
unionist east were generally higher than in the 
west of Northern Ireland. Participation in West 
Belfast (48.9 per cent) and Foyle (58.7 per cent) 
was the lowest anywhere. 
But if the campaign was low key, the 
aftermath was anything but. Like the rest of 
the UK, Northern Ireland woke up on 24 June 
to a political earthquake with no evidence of 
emergency response planning. 
All of a sudden, or so it seemed, the seismic 
nature of the consequences became the central 
political fact. Politicians at Westminster made 
plans for “Brexit means Brexit”. Nicola Sturgeon 
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declared that any move to take Scotland out of 
the EU would be “democratically unacceptable”. 
In Northern Ireland, the consequences of the 
result were at once less obviously dramatic, yet 
more evidently cataclysmic. While 56 per cent of 
the voters opted to Remain, including majorities 
in four of the 11 Unionist-held Westminster 
constituencies, nobody, it appeared, was 
capable of representing that fact politically. 
DUP First Minister, Arlene Foster, triumphant 
in May, prioritised the views of a minority 
in Northern Ireland, including in her own 
constituency, in favour of the pro-Leave 
majority of party and the wider UK. Deputy 
First Minister, Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness, 
represented a party still refusing to take its 
seats in Westminster and uncomfortable 
with negotiation within a British framework. 
Furthermore, the Ulster Unionists could 
not accept the leadership of either party in 
representing its complex perspective. 
Constitutional Consequences
If the result effectively paralysed and divided 
the political classes, nobody, it seemed, wanted 
to articulate the potential constitutional 
consequences. Almost certainly, this reflects the 
magnitude of the risks and the fragility of the 
leadership. 
At a practical, if still superficial, level, this 
challenge is exemplified by the transformation 
of the open border between both Irish 
jurisdictions into a unique land border between 
the UK the EU, making the economics of 
customs control and the politics of immigration 
both more complicated and more pressing. 
The real challenges of Brexit are dramatically 
underlined by the importance of access to 
European markets for Irish agriculture and food, 
and the cross-border structure of tourism and 
single markets for energy.
But far more importantly, Brexit appears to 
put the fundamental structure of the fragile 
peace process into question, by removing 
its central structural support. The modicum 
of political stability achieved in Northern 
Ireland since 1985, was built almost entirely on 
accommodations and compromises negotiated 
by the UK and Ireland within the European 
Union. Like a game of diplomatic Jenga, the 
edifice of political stability in Northern Ireland 
now teeters in a state of uncertainty.
The problem is clearest if the demands of 
Brexit are set against the terms of the Good 
Friday Agreement of 1998, itself approved in an 
all-Ireland referendum, including 71 per cent of 
an 81 per cent turnout in Northern Ireland. By 
establishing international law to regulate the 
affairs of Northern Ireland, the UK accepted the 
specific and unique nature of Northern Ireland 
within which “it is for the people of the island 
of Ireland alone, by agreement between the 
two parts respectively and without external 
impediment, to exercise their right of self-
determination on the basis of consent, freely 
and concurrently given, North and South”. 
While Ireland accepts the constitutional basis 
of British sovereignty, the quid pro quo is the 
extension of “the birth-right of all the people 
of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and 
be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they 
may so choose” to all those born in Northern 
Ireland, as a matter of personal choice, in 
perpetuity. In the context of Brexit, all of the 
citizens of one part of the UK remain eligible 
citizens of the European Union. 
This principle of cross border co-operation is 
built into the institutions of government. Under 
the Agreement, the Irish government has a 
specific and direct right to make representations 
to the UK government in relation to Northern 
Ireland “in recognition of the Irish Government’s 
special interest in Northern Ireland and of 
the extent to which issues of mutual concern 
arise in relation to Northern Ireland”. This 
applies specifically to security co-operation “in 
particular, the areas of rights, justice, prisons 
and policing in Northern Ireland”. The Northern 
Ireland government has to operate with parity 
of esteem for the “the identity, ethos, and 
aspirations of both communities”. Indeed, the 
continued existence of the Stormont Assembly 
is “mutually interdependent” with the cross-
border North/South Ministerial Council, where 
it is made clear “that one cannot successfully 
function without the other”. 
All About Belonging
Over the years, this interdependence of peace 
in Northern Ireland with British-Irish co-
operation and European integration, was held 
up as a specific strength by both British and 
Irish politicians. Addressing the Irish Parliament 
(Oireachtas) in 1998, Tony Blair identified the 
purpose of the peace process as “all about 
belonging”. He continued: “My point is very 
simple. Those urges to belong, divergent as 
they are, can live together more easily if we, 
Britain and the Irish Republic, can live closer 
together too”. All of this, he suggested, was 
underpinned by European integration: “It is 
25 years since we both joined what was then 
the EEC. We have had different approaches to 
agriculture, to monetary union, to defence. But 
increasingly, we share a common agenda and 
common objectives…There is no resistance to 
full-hearted European co-operation wherever 
this brings added value to us all.” On his “return 
visit” to Westminster in 2007, Irish Prime 
Minister Bertie Ahern responded that: “Today 
our partnership in the world is expressed most 
especially in the European Union. Our joint 
membership has served as a vital catalyst for 
the building of a deeper relationship between 
our two islands. Europe forms a key part of our 
shared future. The European Union has acted 
as a potent example of a new political model 
that enables old enemies to become partners 
in progress.”
The internal fragility of the arrangements 
agreed in 1998, has been repeatedly underlined 
by events in Northern Ireland. Devolution 
since 2007 has faced a series of mini-crises 
over policing (2010), flags, parades and the 
Past (2013-15), paramilitarism (2015) and the 
sovereignty of the UK over welfare (2014-15). 
The crucial stabilising innovation of the Good 
Friday Agreement was the accommodation 
of divergent identities within a framework of 
international law and internationally agreed 
principles and structures, which allowed for 
the for the exercise of sovereignty by consent. 
By upending supra national authority in the 
UK, putting into question the framework for 
freedom of movement and freedom of goods 
and services, and reintroducing the prospect 
of territorial separation and borders on the 
island of Ireland, the Brexit referendum puts into 
question a fundamental element of stability, 
without resolving the issue of what comes next.
To date, all sides have been keen to 
emphasise the need to find pragmatic 
solutions. Theresa Villiers was swiftly replaced 
by James Brokenshire, a close ally of new 
Prime Minister Theresa May, as Secretary of 
State. In the meantime, there is talk of judicial 
reviews, and the evident problem that nobody 
can speak for the most vulnerable economy 
on these islands at a time of maximum risk. 
But without any clear roadmap and no clear 
champion, it is simply impossible to predict 
where this ends. The risk to the intricate tower 
of Jenga blocks is both clear and urgent.
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